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INTRODUCTION

Empirical research substantiates that the judges' gender makes a
difference in sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases. Namely, female
judges are more likely than male judges to render a decision in the employee
plaintiffs' favor, presumably because male and female judges have different
perspectives on what constitutes sex discrimination and sexual harassment.
The author's empirical study of arbitration of sex discrimination cases
administered by the American Arbitration Association between 2010 and
2014, however, finds that this judges' "gender effect" does not occur. Namely,
there is no significant difference in the decision-making patterns of female and
male arbitrators as indicated by case outcomes.
This contrast between a judge's gender effect and the absence of an
arbitrator's gender effect is particularly worth exploring, given the wide (and
often mandatory) use of arbitration to resolve sex discrimination cases and the
resulting decrease in the use of the courts. Notably, the broad utilization of
arbitrations in employment disputes occurs even though employees may
strongly prefer the judicial process.
This article begins in Part I with a summary of the research on the effect
of judges' gender in sex discrimination and sexual harassment case outcomes.
This "gender effect" among judges in litigation is explained, and the value of
alternative viewpoints in decisionmaking is noted. Part II briefly explores the
increasing and extensive use of mandatory arbitration for resolving sex
discrimination and sexual harassment workplace disputes. It also observes
fundamental differences between litigation and arbitration, raising questions
about the procedural and substantive adequacy of arbitration. Part III
describes the author's exploratory empirical study of the effect of arbitrators'
gender on case outcomes, revealing the absence of the arbitrators' "gender
effect." Part IV further discusses the explanations and implications of this
finding, particularly given the judges' gender effect found in litigation. It
proposes that characteristics of arbitrators, the arbitration process, and
arbitration cases all combine to help explain the gender effect differences.
Finally, the article suggests that this specific inquiry about gender effect
differences actually reveals concerns about the arbitration process more
broadly: do the employers' advantages as repeat players, the arbitrators'
competitive pressures, and the arbitrators' unmonitored discretion in decisionmaking all combine to both explain the gender effect differences and
problematic biases in the arbitration process?
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I.

JUDGES' GENDER MATTERS IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES

In recent years, researchers have conducted substantial and provocative
work on the effect of a judge's gender on sex discrimination and sexual
harassment case outcomes.' While the effect of the judges' gender is less clear
in other types of cases, 2 there is a consensus on the effect in these cases. The
judges' gender matters: plaintiffs, who are typically female, are more likely
to be successful before female judges than male judges.
While an array of studies have drawn this conclusion, the following widely
cited studies exemplify the research methods and the findings. The first is a
landmark study by Jennifer Peresie; 3 the second is a methodologically
innovative study by Christine Boyd and her colleagues.'
Jennifer Peresie studied all sexual harassment and sex discrimination
cases decided by the Federal Courts of Appeals between 1999 and 2001.' The
data set identifies 556 total cases (all involving appellate review on the merits
of the claims), consisting of 1,666 decisions rendered by individual judges.
Her findings are striking. First, it is difficult for plaintiffs (most typically
female employees) to succeed in their sexual harassment and sex
discrimination cases against the defendants (typically the employing
company). In 73% of these cases, the plaintiffs lose. 6 In other words,
plaintiffs have no better than a one in four chance of success.7
Moreover, Peresie finds that judge's gender makes a difference in his or
her outcome voting behavior.8 While both male and female judges generally
rule against plaintiffs, malejudges are significantly more likely to do so. They
hold for the plaintiffs only 24% of the time.9 In contrast, female judges are
' While this empirical work does not predict what any one particularjudge will decide
in any one particular case, it can indicate meaningful patterns in judicial decision-making.
See, e.g., Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untanglingthe CausalEffects
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the US. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under
Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER
AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER 28-40 (2013); and Pat K.
Chew, Judges' Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging EvidenceBased Empirical Conclusions, 14 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE, JUST. 359 (2011).
2 See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 1, at 389.
'See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmakingin the FederalAppellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005).
4 Boyd et al., supra note 1, at 389.
' Peresie, supra note 3, at 1767.
6
Id. at 1768.

7 ld at 1767-69.
8
1d. at 1776-77.
9 Id. at 1769.
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more likely to hold for the plaintiffs, reaching a decision in their favor 39% of
the time. 10 Thus, having a female judge increases the probability of a
plaintiffs success by 86% in sexual harassment cases and 65% in sex
discrimination cases.' 1
In addition, Peresie finds that the presence of women on an appellate panel
affects how male judges vote.' 2 Namely, male judges are more likely to hold
for the plaintiff when at least one female judge serves on the panel. 13
Specifically, the presence of a female judge more than doubles the probability
that a male judge rules for the plaintiff in sexual harassment cases and nearly
triples the probability in sex discrimination cases. 14 Peresie further finds this
gender effect regardless of the political ideology of the female judge (as
indicated by the political party of the appointing president). 15 Likewise,
having a female judge-whether liberal or conservative-increases the
6
probability of plaintiffs' success on panels ofjudges with varying ideologies.1
A study by Christina Boyd and her associates analyzes the effect of
judges' gender in the federal appellate courts in thirteen different subject areas,
including sex discrimination cases. 17 They used a research method that
compares cases and judges with shared characteristics, rather than the more
typical logistic regression method which considers all cases and judges. These
researchers match cases (e.g. year of decision and direction of the lower court
decision) and judges (e.g., ideology and age) that are as similar as possible and
then analyze whether the judge's gender makes a difference.18
They find it made a significant difference in sex discrimination cases in
both how individual judges vote (female judges are more likely than male
judges to vote for the plaintiffs) and in the kind of panel effects described
above. Specifically, in sex discrimination cases overall, their results indicate
that the likelihood of a male judge holding for the plaintiff increases by 12%
to 14% when a female sits on the panel. 9 When taking into account political
ideology, the effect is further amplified: for male judges at "relatively average

10Id.

"I d.at 1776.
12 Id at 1776-79.
" Id. at 1778.

id. (the presence of a female judge increases the probability from 16% to 35%
that a male judge rules for the plaintiff in sexual harassment cases and increases the
probability
from 11% to 30% in sex discrimination cases).
' 5 Id. at 1777.
161d. at 1787.
17See generally Boyd et al., supra note 1.
18 Id.at 389, 395, 397.
'9Id.at 406.
14 See
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levels of political ideology," the likelihood of a vote for the plaintiff increases
by almost 85% when a female judge is on the panel.2"
As Boyd discusses more generally:
[W]e observe consistent and statistically significant
individual and panel effects in sex discrimination disputes;
not only do males and females bring distinct approaches to
these cases, but the presence of a female on a panel actually
causes male judges to vote in a way they otherwise would
not - in favor of plaintiffs.2'
A. Explainingthe Judges' GenderEffect

To summarize: femalejudges have different decisionmaking patterns than
their male colleagues, and the presence of a female judge on an appellate panel
influences the decisionmaking of her male judicial colleagues in sex
discrimination cases. This consistent phenomenon is what this author calls the
"judges' gender effect." How might we explain the judges' gender effect in
Peresie's, Boyd's, and others' studies?
Extensive existing empirical social psychology research provides us with
several possible explanations. First, many investigators have demonstrated
that women have distinct experiences and socialization.2 2 These experiences
and socialization yield unique and valuable information that becomes
especially salient when evaluating situations involving complex gender
dynamics, such as sexual harassment in the workplace. In this way, both male
and female judges bring distinct insights to their own decision-making,
including their assessment of sex discrimination and sexual harassment,
claims.23
Furthermore, substantial research indicates that women have different
views than men on what constitutes sex discrimination and sexual
harassment. 2 4 In a meta-analysis of the relevant research, for instance,
20

Id.

21 Id

22 See, e.g., Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and

Interaction, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 191 (1999). See also KENNEY, supra note 1, at 1-18
(applies this research to female judges).
23 As consistent with the informational account for the judges' gender effect. Boyd,
et al.,24supra note 1, at 391-92. See also Peresie, supra note 3, at 1780 n.88.
See generally Maria Rotundo et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences
in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 914 (2001); Kimberly A.
Lonsway et al., Sexual Harassment Mythology: Definition, Conceptualization, and
Measurement, 58 SEX ROLES 599 (2008).
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Rotunda and her associates found ample evidence of gender differences, with
women considering a broader range of behavior as sexual harassment.25 While
these differences are not always great, they are meaningful. Further, she noted
that the magnitude of the gender differences varies by the type of conduct at
issue.6 Referring to seven categories of conduct, as shown below, she found
the magnitude of the female-male differences were larger for conduct
involving derogatory attitudes such as sex-stereotyped jokes, both those
directed at women in general (impersonal) and those directed at specific
individuals (personal). She also found that men and women were more likely
to differ on whether pressure for dates constituted sexual harassment. Larger
gender differences for physical sexual conduct such as fondling or kissing also
exist. To illustrate, in one study, 89% of women considered sexual touching
as sexual harassment, as compared to 59% of men.27 Men may view this kind
of contact as a compliment, while women may view it as threatening. In
contrast, smaller female-male differences exist in conduct involving sexual
propositions and sexual coercion. Both genders are likely to perceive these
behavior as sexual harassment. Similarly, smaller gender differences exist
with physical nonsexual conduct such as a congratulatory hug. Both genders
are likely to conclude that this kind of conduct is not sexual harassment.28
Table I
Descriptionof Seven BehavioralCategoriesof Sexual Harassment
Behavioral examples
Description
Category
Obscene gestures not
Behaviors that reflect
Derogatory
directed at target.
derogatory attitudes
attitudesSex-stereotyped jokes.
impersonal
about men or women in
general
Obscene phone calls.
Derogatory
Behaviors that are
directed at the target that Belittling the target's
attitudes-personal
competence.
reflect derogatory
attitudes about the
target's gender
Repeated requests to go
Persistent requests for
Unwanted dating
pressure
dates after the target has out after work or
school.
refused

25 Rotundo et al., supra note 24, at 919.
26

1d. at 918.
Id. at 920.
28 Id. at 919-20, tbl. 1.
27

200
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Category
Sexual propositions
Physical sexual
contact

Physical nonsexual
contact

Sexual coercion

Description
Explicit requests for
sexual encounters
Behaviors in which the
harasser makes physical
sexual contact with the
target
Behaviors in which the
harasser makes physical
nonsexual contact with
the target
Requests for sexual
encounters or forced
encounters that are made
a condition of
employment or
promotion

Behavioral examples
Proposition for an
affair.
Embracing the target.
Kissing the target.

Congratulatory hug.

Threatening
punishment unless
sexual favors are given.
Sexual bribery.

When applied specifically to sex discrimination and sexual harassment
cases, these insights are especially relevant.29 In sexual harassment cases, for
instance, key inquiries are whether the harassment was attributable to the
employee's sex (rather than some other reason) and whether the harassment
was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to create a hostile work environment.3"
In sex discrimination cases, a key inquiry is whether an employment decision
was motivated by gender.3
This body of research has additional applications to appellate panels,
where jurists engage in deliberative and collegial processes and can "be
swayed by an articulate and well-reasoned arguments from a colleague with a
different opinion."32 Indeed, researchers explained that when a women is on
29 While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (2016), defines sexual harassment as verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature that unreasonably interferes with an individual'sjob performance or creates a hostile
work environment, questions on its interpretation remain. Which factsjustify a conclusion
of sexual harassment? Courts look to the perceptions of a reasonable person in similar
circumstances. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Mich. 1984). The
research on gender differences is relevant to the perception of this "reasonable person."
" See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Sevs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
3"See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (describing the basic legal inquiries in a federal employment
discrimination claim).
32 Peresie, supra note 3, at 1782 n.92.

OHIO STA TE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 32:2 20171

an appellate panel, her male colleagues perceive her knowledge about sex
discrimination "as more credible and persuasive" than their own knowledgethereby affecting the male judges' decisions.33 Peresie likewise suggests that
male judges may defer to female judges on sex discrimination cases, taking
their "cue" from female judges who they view as having particular insights.
She further finds evidence that male judges "learned" in sexual harassment
cases. She found that the greater number of the cases in which a male judge
had previously sat with a female judge, the more likely he is to rule for the
plaintiff in a given case.34 In these ways, a kind of repeat player learning curve
apparently occurs.
B.

Value of Judges' Gender Effect

Social science research consistently demonstrates that incorporation of
35
diverse viewpoints is an important complement to sound decisionmaking.
Likewise, evidence indicates that when groups are comprised of more diverse
members, those members learn from each other and provide checks on the
correctness of shared information, ultimately leading to more accurate
decisionmaking. 36 When we apply these findings to the law, we would expect
incorporation of diverse perspectives and viewpoints to improve the accuracy
of legal decisionmaking. For instance, in sexual harassment cases, research
suggests men may be less likely to consider sex-role stereotyping of women
or sexually suggestive microaggressions as cognizable sexual harassment.37
In contrast, female judges may notice subtleties about what constitutes bias
that malejudges do not see.38 In this way, the gendered perspective of a female

3 Boyd et al., supra note 1, at 392.
34Peresie, supra note 3, at 1784 n.103. Women may similarly defer to male
colleagues regarding experiences on which they have particular insight. Id.
" Gender diversity also appears to contribute in other ways. See, e.g., Christina L.
Boyd, She'll Settle It, I J.L. & CTS. 193 (2013) (research on gender differences in
management skills, finding that in civil rights cases and tort cases, female judges are more
likely than male judges to successfully foster settlement of their cases).
36 See, e.g., Sheen S. Levine & David Stark, Diversity Makes you Brighter, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2015, http://wvw.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/opinion/diversity-makes-youbrighter.html?ref-topics& r-0 (research indicating that ethnically diverse groups selfcorrect and thus make more correct economic decisions); Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic
Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES 18524 (2014) (describes research study described in NY Times article).

" See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.

38

See

THERESA

M.

BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL

SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL .HARASSMENT LAW (New

2005).

York University Press,
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judge may result in a more nuanced, textured, or comprehensive analysis of
the facts and the law.
Does gendered perspective make a female judge's decision inherently
more valid or "fair" than a male judge's? Alternatively, does it make it less
valid or "fair"? In a democratic society where half the population and almost
all the aggrieved employees in sex discrimination cases are women, the
representation of views from both genders is important. Our notions of
fairness and the legitimacy of the process require such representation. 39
Denying gendered views-whether male or female- is a sign of stigma and
exclusion which sends the signal that those perspectives are not worthy and
should not be part of the discourse.4" We have seen that gendered perspectives
inform the outcomes of sexual harassment and discrimination cases when
decided by judges. As more women join the judiciary, we expect that case
outcomes will reflect further "gendered perspective" equilibrium.4

I.

ARBITRATION IN CONTRAST TO LITIGATION

Over the last three decades, a dramatic transition in civil justice has been
underfoot, particularly since the Supreme Court case of Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.42 More disputes that were once resolved in
courts are now resolved in private dispute resolution processes, such as
arbitration. "3 Of particular relevance here, many employment disputes,
including sex discrimination complaints, go to arbitration." Pursuant to
employer-mandated grievance procedures in many corporate settings,
thousands of employees are required to resolve their disputes with their
'9 KENNEY, supra note 1,at 127 (explaining how "justice must not only be don6, it
must be seen to be done"); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is "(Im)PartialEnough " in a World of
Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 395, 424 (2010) (explaining that perceptions of
fairness are based in part on the opportunity for people to tell their stories).
40 KENNEY, supra note 1, at 176-79.
41 See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, Gender,

CriticalMass, andJudicialDecisionMaking, 32 LAW & POL'Y 260 (2010) (indicating that
women judges exhibit distinctive behavior in criminal justice and civil rights cases when
there is a critical mass of women).
42 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
13Alexander J. S. Colvin, Employment Arbitration:EmpiricalFindingsandResearch
Needs, 64 Disp. RESOL. J. 6 (2009); e.g., Welsh, supra note 39, at 417; accord, R. Scott
Oswald & Adam A. Carter, ForcedArbitration Clauses as Condition of Employment, 83
BNA INSIGHTS 956 (2014); but see Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with
ADR: Evolving Perceptionsand Use of Mediation,Arbitration,andConflict Management
in Fortune 1000 Corporations,19 HARV.NEG. L. REv. 1, 12 (2014) (noting increased use
of mediation).
'A See Colvin, supra note 43.
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employers in arbitration. One survey indicated almost half of all businesses
had employer promulgated arbitration programs. 4 5 This occurs even though
the employees' complaints have a statutory basis and employees would prefer
to take their complaints to the courts.4 6
Litigation and arbitration, however, differ in critical ways including their
fundamental nature, the selection of the decisionmakers, and the procedures
for the decisionmaking process. While arbitration presumably has efficiency
and convenience advantages, does it offer a comparably fair and just process
for resolving disputes? 7 The court system has carefully designed the litigation
process with many required procedural rules intended to ensure adequate due
process to all those involved. 48 Arbitration, in contrast, is essentially a
privately designed dispute resolution process captured in a legally enforceable
contract. Like other contracts, the courts do not review the terms and equity
of the agreement to arbitrate unless one of the parties argues that the agreement
violates fundamental contract principles.4 9
In litigation, judges or juries are the decisionmakers, resolving the legal,
disputes before them. Federal courtjudges, for instance, are selected through
a formal and systematic process where judicial candidates are rigorously
vetted.5" In addition, practicing judges are public figures and are subject to an
array of professional rules of conduct.5' In contrast to litigation, arbitrators in
arbitrations are the decisionmakers. There is no mandated or systematic
" Id. at 6. 757 nonunion businesses indicated 46.8% had employer promulgated
arbitration programs. Id.
46 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.

41 Welsh, supra note 39, at 424-25 (further describing procedural justice issues); e.g.,
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in

Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1369 (warning that informality of
alternative dispute processes without the due process safeguards of the court system might
leave certain parties with less power more vulnerable); accord,Jessica Silver-Greenberg
& Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 'Privatizationof the Justice System,'N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2015,

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-

privatization-of-the-justice-system.html? r-0.
48

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. (2016); JUDITH RESNIK, PROCESSES OF THE LAW:
(Foundation Press 2004).

UNDERSTANDING COURTS AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES

E.g., Hooters of America v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d. 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix,
4'

840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
50
How
Judges

and

Justices

are

Chosen,

US

HISTORY,

http://www.ushistory.org/gov/9d.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (describing process of
nomination and selection of federal judges).
51 History
of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf~page/judges.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2016)
(providing biographical information on all federal court judges).
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method of selecting arbitrators.5 2 Arbitrators are technically selected and
agreed upon by both parties in most cases; however, as with all contracts, one
party may have more bargaining power and expertise.
Indeed, in employment arbitrations, employers typically have several
process advantages. First, employers typically have more resources; are more
experienced in vetting and using arbitration service providers, such as the
American Arbitration Association; are more familiar with prospective
arbitrators, and can access informal word-of-mouth referrals.53 Nancy Welsh,
for instance, noted the control that institutional repeat players have "over the
selection of the organization that will provide the dispute resolution services,
the procedures that will be used, and the criteria that will be used to determine
the pool of neutrals who will decide cases. ...
"
Meanwhile, employee plaintiffs have more limited resources and are
presumably participating in an employment arbitration this one time.55 As a
result, plaintiffs are less familiar with how the system works and who the
prospective arbitrators are. Consistent with the private nature of arbitrations,
the selection of arbitrators is a private, rather than a public, process. While
there are initiatives to provide more publicly available information about
arbitrators," currently no comprehensive public directory of arbitrators exists
and no readily accessible record of arbitrations over which they have presided
exists.
Finally, in the litigation system, the proceedings are governed by a system
of legal principles and a tradition of publicly available precedents. Judicial
rulings are reviewable through an appellate process. In contrast, the parties in
the arbitration can instruct arbitrators to use whatever criteria they choose for
resolving the dispute, such as industry customs or notions of equity.5 7 The
arbitrators are not automatically bound to follow legal principles or legal
52 But see JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 463
(4th ed. 2013), and other examples of proposals for aspirational due process procedures
protocols for arbitration.
13 Gina Viola Brown & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Gender Differences in Dispute

Resolution Practice: Report on the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution PracticeSnapshot
Survey (MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER No. 14-04, 2014),

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=2390278.
54Welsh, supra note 39, at 418.
" Plaintiffs who use lawyers who are experienced in arbitrating employment disputes
may also
benefit from whatever knowledge and contacts that lawyer has as a repeat player.
56
See e.g., CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014)
(advocating that international arbitrators self-regulate, including more public
dissemination of publicly available information about prospective arbitrators).
57 NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 52, at 216-17 (noting research showing that most
arbitrators thought they could ignore substantive law ifjustice required).
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precedents. Even when arbitrators ostensibly defer to legal principles and
precedents, there is no process for reviewing whether their application of legal
precedents is correct. Arbitrations are typically final and binding awards and
not subject to any further judicial review on the merits.58 In these ways,
arbitrators have more discretion than judges during the arbitral
decisionmaking process and fewer checks for any abuses of discretion.
IV.

ARBITRATORS' GENDER IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES

Given the compelling work on judges' gender and the increasing use and
concerns about the arbitration process, this article tackles the following
questions:
Does the arbitrators' gender make a difference in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment case outcomes, as it does for judges in
litigation? If so, does it matter? If having a female arbitrator increases the
likelihood of plaintiff success, this result would mirror the presence and
potential benefits of gendered perspectives in judicial litigation. On the other
hand, if the arbitrator's gender does not affect outcomes, what explains the
discrepancy in decisionmaking between femalejudges and female arbitrators?
How might this disadvantage the increasing number of employee
complainants who are forced to use arbitration?
While comprehensive information about arbitration between private
parties continues to be elusive, increased access to a wealth of information
about arbitral opinions from sources such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) has become available in recent years. Alexander Colvin,
for instance, extensively studies the AAA files and offers general descriptive
information about the arbitration process.59 In one study, Colvin reviewed all
employer-promulgated cases reported by the AAA over a four-year period.6 °
Among other variables, Colvin determined the overall employee success rate,
number of claims, claimant's salaries, time for disposition, award amounts,
and arbitration fees. 61 In comparison with litigation, Colvin observed that
1) employees' win rates are decreased in arbitration, 2) award amounts are
58

There are very limited bases for a judicial review of an arbitration award, as

delineated in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1925). See also Michael H.
LeRoby, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitratorand the Demise of Judicial
Review, 29 J. DiSP. RESOL. 1, 34-40 (2009).

" Alexander Colvin & Kelly Pike, The Impact of Case and Arbitrator Characteristics
on Employment Arbitration Outcomes (June 2012); e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2011); accord,Colvin, Employment Arbitration,supra note
43.
6 Colvin, An EmpiricalStudy of Employment Arbitration,supra note 59, at 1.
61 Id.
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less, and 3) there is a shorter time to dispose of the dispute.6 2 Thus, employee
plaintiffs as a group are substantively worse off in arbitration than in litigation,
although the disputes are resolved more quickly. There is also strong evidence
of a repeat player effect, again to the disadvantage of employees: employee
win rates and awards are significantly lower when the employer has been in
multiple arbitrations. 63 In addition, there is strong evidence of repeat
employer-arbitration pairing effect: employees have lower win rates and
receive smaller damage awards when the same arbitrator is involved in more
than one case with the same employer. 6
The original research conducted for this article is unique given its
particular focus on sex discrimination and sexual harassment arbitration
cases. 65
The study empirically investigates AAA arbitration sex
discrimination and sexual harassment cases between 2010-2014, analyzing a
number of variables including the effect of the arbitrators' gender on case
outcomes.66 Given the existing findings that female judges are more likely
62 Id. at

30.

63 Id.at 30-31.

641Id.
6' As described earlier, there are studies on the effect of judges' gender in relevant
court cases. See infra Part Il. There also are limited studies on gender effects in labor
arbitrations, but those arbitrations are subject to specific precedents and rules consistent
with federal labor law while the cases in this study are from the non-union private sector
workplace. Sandra M. Crews, Gender and Labor Arbitration Reasoning: A Different Voice
or Occupational Socialization? (May 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Missouri-St. Louis) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations & Theses A&I); e.g., Anne L.
Draznin, Gender Factors in Labor Arbitrator Selection (Nov. 2000) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Graduate School of Saint Louis) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations &
Theses A&I); accord, Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Grievance Arbitration,29 IND.
RELAT. 513 (1990). See, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E.Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, The Influence of
Arbitrator Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & Bus.
REV. 43 (2014); see also, David Lipsky, Ryan Lamare & Abhishek Gupta, The Effect of
Gender on Awards in Employment Arbitration Cases: The Experience in the Financial
SecuritiesIndustry, 52 INDUS. REL. 314 (2013).
The most similar research to this study is on AAA employment cases and employment
discrimination cases generally rather than sex discrimination cases specifically. Colvin &
Pike, supra note 59. In that study, Colvin found a plaintiff success rate of 20% in employer
promulgated arbitration agreements before female arbitrators and a 27.5% success rate
before male arbitrators. He further noted: "This is a surprising finding ....
One possibility
that needs to be investigated further is whether there are systematic differences in the
professional backgrounds of female arbitrators. For example, are female arbitrators more
likely to come from backgrounds representing management?" Id at 20.
' The arbitration cases were identified through AAA Arbitration Awards,
LEXISNEXIS GROUP (last visited May 1,2014) for the May 2010 to May 2014 period.
The percentage and number of cases in each year are as follows: 13.1% in 2010 (n=16),
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than male judges to rule in favor of plaintiffs, the author predicted that female
arbitrators would follow a similar pattern. Instead, evidence supports the
opposite: there is no significant difference in case outcomes decided by female
versus male arbitrators.
As shown below, of the 121 cases in the study, employee plaintiffs are
successful in only 14%. "Success" was defined broadly to include any case
outcome where the plaintiff received some part of what they claimed. If only
cases where the plaintiff was totally successful are considered, their success
rate drops to 8.3% of the cases. This plaintiff success rate is less than the
25.2% success rate in all employment arbitration cases,67 indicating that
employees are even less likely to win sex discrimination and sexual
harassment cases than other employment disputes. Moreover, the success rate
for employees in arbitration is notably less than the 27% success rate for
employees in litigation as indicated in the Peresie study.68
M

F

Total

24.0%

39.0%

27%

Arbitrators in SD/SH cases 14.7%

13.0%

14%

Judges in SD/SH cases

Particularly relevant to this article, the data shows an arbitrator's gender
has no effect on outcomes. A male arbitrator presides over 62% (n=75) of the
cases, while a female arbitrator presides over 38% (n=46) of the cases. Male
arbitrators hold in favor of plaintiffs 14.7% of the time; female arbitrators hold
in favor of plaintiffs 13% of the time. The difference between these
percentages is not statistically significant. For a comparative reference, the
data from Peresie's study on judges' gender is also provided.6 9 In the Peresie
28 in 2011, 28 in 2012, 40 in 2013, and 10 in 2014, with no significant difference in
plaintiff win rates by years. While the number of female plaintiffs (73%) is greater than
male plaintiffs 25.4%, (89 versus 31), males represented about a third of all plaintiffs.
However, there is no significant difference in the success rates of female versus male
plaintiffs. The type of cases are also studied: 50% (61 are based on sex discrimination
claims only), 24.6% (30 on sexual harassment claims only), 19.7% (24 on both sex
discrimination and sexual harassment claims), and 47.5% (58 that include a retaliation
claim.) Again, there is no significant difference in success rates based on the type of claim.
67 Colvin & Pike, supra note 59, at 26, tbl. 1 (in employer-promulgated arbitration
agreements). The plaintiff success rate in employment discrimination cases was 18.8%,
also higher than the success rate in the present study. Id. at 17.
68 Peresie, supra note 3, at 1776-79.
69 Id.
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study, the differences between the male judges' and the female judges'
decisionmaking patterns are statistically significant.
Comparing the decisionmaking patterns of male judges with male
arbitrators and femalejudges with female arbitrators is also worthwhile. Male
arbitrators are less likely than male judges to hold for claimants (9%
difference). Female arbitrators, however, are much less likely than female
judges to hold for the claimants (26% difference). In fact, women arbitrators
had the lowest claimant success rate of any group. Thus, the author fimds no
within-group variance (between female and male arbitrators), but did observe
large between-group variance (between female arbitrators and female judges).
This suggests further consideration of female arbitrators is needed.70
V.

EXPLANATIONS FOR GENDER EFFECT DIFFERENCES

Why does a gender effect exist among judges and not among arbitrators?
In particular, what might explain the wide discrepancy between female judges'
and female arbitrators' decisionmaking patterns? Why are female arbitrators
more likely than female judges to hold against the plaintiff (and for the
defendant employers)?
Some tentative explanations focus on the decisionmakers (the judges and
arbitrators) or the dispute resolution processes (litigation and arbitration).
Finally, this article notes but ultimately discounts the possibility that the
different cases in litigation and arbitration help explain the lack of an
arbitrators' gender effect.

" The analysis is based on all the sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases over
a recent four-year period. While the number of cases analyzed is sufficient to determine
statistical significance, there are still a relatively small number of arbitration cases
particularly in the subset comparisons. In addition, this data set is from the AAA, the
largest provider of arbitration services, and the AAA indicated that this was a
comprehensive collection of employer-promulgated arbitrations.
However, other
organizations provide arbitration services in the United States, as well as ad hoc
arbitrations separate from those conducted by arbitration organizations. Thus, an analysis
of those cases might theoretically yield different research results. Finally, these cases are
all employer-promulgated cases. It could be that a study of both employer-promulgated
and ad hoc individually negotiated employee arbitrations may yield different results. At
the same time, given the scope of the study (the universe of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment cases during a relatively lengthy period of four years), this exploratory study
provides a meaningful glimpse into the effect of the arbitrators' gender in these types of
cases.
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A. Decisionmakers(Judges andArbitrators)are Distinguishable
Perhaps femalejudges and arbitrators are distinguishable in ways that help
explain their contrasting decisionmaking patterns. Women who become
judges and those who become arbitrators may have contrasting education,
socialization, or political orientations. For instance, if female arbitrators as a
group are more likely to have business backgrounds or are more politically
conservative, they may more likely identify with the management perspective
than the employee perspective. Research suggests a person's ideology on the
feminist movement, for instance, affects the way one thinks about sexual
harassment.7
In addition, the selection process for arbitrators shapes who is selected.
Simply put, employers have more control than employees over who is selected
as the arbitrator.72 As described earlier, employers are repeat players who are
likely to be more familiar with the arbitration process, including the selection
of the arbitrators. They have more knowledge of the pool of arbitrators and
their reputations. There is some evidence they have input into the pool of
arbitrators listed with arbitration service providers, such as the AAA. 3 As
repeat players, they are the most predictable users of arbitration services, and
hence arbitrators' prime target clients. Employers' counsels naturally choose
arbitrators, male or female, whom they believe empathize or can at least
identify with their position. In contrast, employees are not repeat players and
hence do not have these same advantages.
At the same time, arbitrators are in the business of arbitrating, which
means they need consumers of their professional services. Unlike federal
judges who are largely immune from market pressures (given their lifetime
tenure), arbitrators are subject to the inherent market pressure to obtain,
satisfy, and maintain consumers. Having a favorable reputation among
corporate counsel is particularly important since they are the prime target
consumers with repeat business or referral possibilities.
71See Kimberly A. Lonsway, Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Sexual Harassment
Mythology: Definition, Conceptualization,and Measurement, 58 SEX ROLES 599 (2008);
Justine E. Tinkler, Resisting the Enforcement of Sexual Harassment Law, 37 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 1, 20 (2012).
72 See supra discussion accompanying notes 52-55 describing employer advantages.
73 See Welsh, supra note 39, at 419 (Describing Public Citizen report on mandatory
arbitration in credit cared disputes, crediting 95% win rate for credit card companies to the
"cozy relationships between arbitral firms and credit-card companies." Welsh describes
the "arbitral firms' reliance upon referrals from particular credit-card companies for the
majority of their cases, the large fees paid by some credit-card companies to these firms,
and the large number of cases handled by a small number of individual arbitrators.").

COMPARING THE EFFECTS OF JUDGES' GENDER AND ARBITRATORS' GENDER

This combination of employers having more control over who is the
arbitrator and arbitrators wanting their business may result in female (and
male) arbitrators who are more management-oriented than their judicial
counterparts. Brown and Schneider's survey research also suggests that
female arbitrators may experience distinctive competitive pressures.74 Their
findings indicate that it is more difficult for women to be selected as
arbitrators. First, women are underrepresented among arbitrators. In their
sample of over 1,250 cases, arbitrators are women 20% of the time and men
80% of the time.7 5 In labor and employment law cases, the split is 32% female
and 68% male arbitrators.7 6 Second, the selection process for arbitrators is
revealing. The two most common processes for arbitrator selection are 1)
choice of the parties, clients, or attorneys of the client; and 2) appointment
from the ADR provider strike list, by the ADR provider, or by the court.77 The
first process depends on professional and personal networks as well as
professional reputation; the second relies on being part of the professional
ADR establishment. Both processes yield a disproportionate percent of male
arbitrators. Female arbitrators are selected only 20% of the time in the first
process and 19% of the time in the second process. 7' These findings evidence
the difficulty of women arbitrators penetrating either the informal or formal
referral and selection systems.7 9 Further, the few women who do make it into
the pool are more likely to be pro-management because the more pro-plaintiff
ones are either intentionally kept out or "de-selected" after it becomes clear to
employer clients that they are not disposed toward management.
B. Dispute Resolution Processes (Litigation andArbitration)are
Distinguishable
As earlier described, the litigation process and the arbitration process are
fundamentally different.8" The arbitration processes' particular characteristics
may also explain the absence of the arbitrators' gender effect. While the
7"Brown & Schneider, supra note 53, at 1-2 (studying lawyer members of American
Bar Association (ABA) Dispute Resolution Section consisting of 743 responses, with 90%
involved as neutrals or advocates in 1,250 ADR cases. There were more men than women
at every practice bracket, but more gender balance with less experienced neutrals.). See
also id.
at 6, chart 6.
75
Id at 9, chart 9.
76
Id. at 11, chart 12.
77

Id. at 20, chart 22.

78 Id at 20, chart 22.
79 This is in contrast to selection of mediators, where there is more gender balance
when80mediators are selected by roster and there is a 53/47 gender split. Id at 19, chart 20.
See supra Part 11.
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judicial process has well-delineated and mandated procedural safeguards,
arbitral procedures are only recommended and largely unmonitored. While
the litigation system is a well-established system of legal rules and precedents
subject to judicial reviews, arbitral decisions are based only on recommended
and largely unmonitored and unreviewable guidelines.
In litigation, well-established jurisprudence for employment
discrimination law with many judicial precedents in both sex discrimination
and sexual harassment cases are followed. The outcome in any particular case
is, of course, not totally predictable, but general legal principles are predictably
followed because of the judicial oversight offered at the pre-trial, trial, and
appellate stages-with much information on public record. The welldelineated procedural rules in court proceedings also help assure that the
relevant evidence is available to the decisionmakers.
No such assurances exist in arbitration. The resulting arbitral latitude
allows arbitrators to consider the parties' extra-legal interests and offer
creative extra-legal solutions, which in theory can serve very positive
purposes. But this arbitral latitude also creates the opportunities for the
arbitrators' more personal judgment and discretion in their reasoning and
decisionmaking. 8 Although not required, arbitrators can refer to sexual
harassment laws as a source for their decisionmaking, presumably to lend
authority to their decisions. However, they are not bound by rigorous legal
interpretations and may be more susceptible to normative pressures.
Tinkler finds, for instance, normative pressure exists for both men and
women in business settings to find that sexual harassment laws have not been
violated, which consequently means that employers and management will not
be held liable.82 She finds that there is resistance to using sexual harassment
laws, even though sexual harassment in the abstract is perceived as wrong and
injurious.
Tinkler posits that this resistance is linked to men and women's status in
the gender hierarchy; that is, that men are seen as more competent and statusworthy than women. 83 Men see the laws as threatening. Women see the laws
as disempowering. They hesitate to categorize actions as sexual harassment
because women who do so are associated with the gender stereotypes of being
emotional, irrational, or overly sensitive.' Women also resent, look down on,
and want to distance themselves from employees who complain of sexual
harassment.8" Tinkler continues that the perceived legal definitions of sexual
81See supra discussion accompanying
82 Tinkler, supra note 71, at 1-3.
83 Id. at 2.
84

8

Id. at 4.
Id at 19.

notes 45-47.
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harassment threatens existing social norms: a man's role is to be aggressive,
in charge of the situation, paying, and taking the initiative in asking for dates.
A woman's role is to be more reactive and passive in defining the social/sexual
relationship.8 6
Thus, these normative pressures may influence women arbitrators
particularly if they are already inclined to identify with a management
perspective. As arbitrators attempting to establish their reputations in a maledominated profession, female arbitrators would understandably want to avoid
being viewed by prospective clients as emotional, irrational, or overly
sensitive. Given that the arbitral process allows them wide and unmonitored
discretion in their decisionmaking, they may be less likely, particularly in
cases that could go either way, to find employees have been sexually harassed
and consequently that employers are liable.
Finally, there is inferential evidence that female arbitrators may be less
confident than their male counterparts and that this tendency may affect their
decisionmaking. In one study, female negotiators were found to be less
confident and male negotiators were over-confident." Preliminary research
also cites examples of women arbitrators as more likely than male arbitrators
to cite external authority (such as judicial opinions), even when they do not
have to.88 One explanation for this behavior is that women arbitrators feel
more of a need to justify their conclusions. Perhaps female arbitrators are
excessively careful or just more prudently careful. Either way, this evidence
suggests women arbitrators may have a higher propensity, for instance in a
close case, to go with management given the normative and business pressures
to do so.

6Id. at5.
7 See Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and OverConfident Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, II YALE

J.L. & FEMINISM 1358 (1999).
" Laura Schneider, "Differences in Perspective: The Impact of Gender in Arbitration
versus Litigation on Sex and Race Discrimination Claims," University of Pittsburgh
Employment Law Arbitration Seminar paper at 13 (2014) (Empirical study finding that
female arbitrators tended to use more external authority than male arbitrators. 89% of all
female arbitrators in sexual discrimination opinions "cited to at least one case of statute
instead of relying solely on the facts of the case to support a decision," as compared to
male arbitrators 57% of the time. Female arbitrators also used these external authorities
more extensively. Females cited cases and statutes multiple times even in short opinions,
whereas males would often only refer to a single case.).
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C. Cases in Litigationand Arbitrationare Distinguishable
Separate from the pro-management arbitrators and the arbitration process
itself, are the cases in litigation and those in arbitration distinguishable in ways
that further explain the differences in gender effect in the two forums? A
consideration of the types of cases combined with the profiles of arbitrators
and judges is revealing.
First, consider the types of cases in litigation and arbitration. Before
discrimination cases come before the court, they go through multiple vetting
stages. First, employees have to decide whether to formally complain, then
their lawyers assess the case merits and presumably advise against weak cases
going forward, and then the EEOC reviews the case. 89 Thus, it is likely that
many of the weakest employee cases fall out. Employers also have incentives
to settle the strongest employee cases--particularly given the employers'
concerns about negative publicity, the expense of litigation, and the
unpredictability of judges' and juries' decisions. However, companies may
not settle if they are trying to send a message to other employees that suits will
be vigorously fought which, in turn, sends the signal that plaintiffs and their
lawyers will have a long and expensive battle on their hands. This strategy is
meant to discourage even strong cases from going to court. Thus, it is also
possible that some of the strongest plaintiff cases do not end up in litigation
either because of pre-trial settlement or plaintiffs dropping it due to expense.
The resulting remaining cases from these employee and employer vetting
processes are those in the middle moderate range, with fewer particularly weak
or clearly strong cases on the merits.
A multi-stage vetting process also occurs with arbitration cases, although
less is known about this process given the private nature of arbitration. It
begins with employees deciding whether to formally complain through the
employers' grievance process." Arbitration is less public and expensive than
litigation, but it is not without employee costs and consequences. An
employee accusing her or his employer of sex discrimination, whether through
litigation or arbitration, creates at best an awkward working situation and at
worst serious employer retaliation. Employees' lawyers also review and
89 See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27

& LAB. L. 49, 61-63 (2006) (describing vetting process in racial
harassment cases).
9 As Gilmer establishes, employees waive their fights to court litigation if they are
subject to mandatory arbitration provisions in their employment relationships. Thus,
employees' choice is whether or not to pursue arbitration; they no longer have the choice
between litigation and arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991).
BERKELEY J. EMP.
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advise on the case's merits, presumably advising against pursuing
unmeritorious claims. Thus, the likely result is that the weakest potential
arbitration cases fall out, though it is possible that, if the employee does not
consult an attorney, she or he may move forward with a weak case.
Employers are also likely to settle the strongest employee cases to avoid
the hassle of arbitration. This tendency to settle, however, may be less
prevalent than with litigation given that arbitration is less expensive, the
process is private, and arbitrators may be considered more predictable and
more inclined toward a management perspective. Given these circumstances,
employers also would not be particularly incentivized to settle moderate
cases. 91 Thus, the employers' and employees' vetting process likely yields a
range of arbitration cases, but particularly moderate to moderately strong cases
with fewer particularly strong or particularly weak cases on the merits.
In summary, the cases in both arbitration and in litigation would cross the
spectrum: many of the weakest cases would have fallen out in both forums
(although perhaps less so in arbitration); the employer would have settled
many of the strongest cases (although perhaps less so in arbitration); and the
largest group of remaining cases would be the ones in the middle.
Now, consider the likely profiles of judges and arbitrators. Judges
represent a more heterogeneous group than arbitrators. Nominations by both
Republican and Democratic presidents, for instance, helps assure that federal
judges will represent the political spectrum. 92 Strikingly, federal court judges
are about evenly split between those nominated by a Democratic president and
a Republican president. Further, it is reasonable to assume that these judges
will represent a spectrum of more pro-employee, more pro-management, or
somewhere in the middle (moderate). In comparison, as discussed earlier,
arbitrators as a group are likely to be more pro-management.93
Thus, when both court cases and judges are considered, the result is court
cases with a range of strengths being decided by judges with ranging degrees
of pro-management, moderate, or pro-employee inclinations. Given these
circumstances, it makes intuitive sense that the outcome of judicial
proceedings taken as whole would be more varied and more difficult to
predict. This effect is accentuated if only a subgroup of cases and judges is
considered: moderately strong cases being judged by moderate judges where
91 Employers also would not be inclined to settle weak cases, but this group may be
relatively small given the employees' and their lawyers' review processes described above.
9 A Republican President nominated 48.8% of all sitting judges and a Democratic
President nominated 51.2%. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsflpage/research categories.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2016).
" See supra Part V.A.
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For this subgroup, one would expect judicial
variance is greatest.
decisionmaking to be challenging, with relevant personal experience including
gender, playing a larger role. Further, the supposition is that the larger the role
for personal experiences in decisionmaking, the larger the gender effect.
With arbitrations, there also is a range of cases from weak to strong, with
many in the middle. Arbitrators, however, are not as heterogeneous as judges
and that lack of variation is likely to make a difference in the outcomes. The
range of cases, particularly the moderate ones, offers the potential for the
arbitrators' insights based on their personal experiences. Yet apparently, this
does not occur. Arbitrators' comparatively homogenous profile, namely
tending to be pro-management, appears to blunt the role of their personal
experience or at least those experiences related to their gender. Hence, the
gender effect among arbitrators is absent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article considers why the arbitrators' gender does not make a
difference in sex discrimination and sexual harassment case outcomes; that is,
male arbitrators and female arbitrators do not have significantly different
decisionmaking patterns. In stark contrast, the judges' gender does make a
difference in these cases. Since the author posits that the gender effect in
litigation affects the judges' decisionmaking process, what about the arbitral
process explains the absence of the arbitrators' gender effect?
This inquiry led the author to considerations and then concerns about the
arbitration process more broadly. While arbitration offers potential solutions
to the costs and backlog of court litigation, those benefits need to be weighed
against the possible downsides of arbitration. This article suggests that
arbitration in practice has some built-in biases that may not serve justice. At
the same time, arbitration is increasingly becoming mandatory in resolving
employment disputes, thus replacing litigation and perhaps providing a fairer
process in outcomes, oversight, and societal acceptance. Simply put,
employers exercise their control as repeat players and tend to select more promanagement arbitrators. Complaining employees subsequently get the short
end of the stick.
What can be done to address these concerns about the arbitration process?
The research on the judges' gender and the arbitrators' gender suggests that
more diversity in arbitrators' profiles would help offset the advantages of
employer repeat players and create a fairer playing field. Perhaps thinking
creatively about how to expand the arbitrators' pool (for instance, through
nominations by judges, bar associations, law school deans, etc.) would yield
arbitrators across a wider spectrum. Perhaps revising the arbitrators' selection
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process so that arbitrators are more randomly selected, or employers are
limited in the number of times they can select the same arbitrator within a
particular time frame, may diversify arbitrators and decrease the repeat-player
advantages. Or perhaps, as with judges, finding ways to diminish the market
and competitive pressures imposed on arbitrators would allow more focus on
the arbitrators' basic qualifications, and thus ultimately minimize arbitrations'
built-in biases and fairly serve both parties to the arbitration.

